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State Ownership and Corporate Governance in China: 
An Executive Career Approach  
 
Li-Wen Lin* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) now comprise over 60 percent of the largest 500 
companies in China and more than 10 percent of Fortune Global 500 companies in the world. Despite 
their importance to China’s domestic economy and foreign investment strategy, many governance 
characteristics of the SOEs remain a black box, one of which is the SOEs’ executive composition and 
recruitment development. This Article shifts away from the typical focus on how the things function (e.g. 
ownership structure and board of directors) to who the people in charge are, which is an important 
approach to understanding corporate governance and economic development in countries with weak 
legal institutions. It investigates the legal guidelines of SOE executive recruitment and the evolution of 
educational, political and career attributes of the CEOs of China’s large SOEs over the past decade. This 
Article utilizes legal, historical, sociological, and comparative methods to explain the change and 
stability of the executive composition in China’s large SOEs. The executive recruitment shows an 
orientation toward politically-bounded and firm-specific professionalism as well as some faint potential 
of bottom-up and competition-driven marketization. The recruitment guidelines and empirical findings in 
this Article raise questions about the adequacy and capacity of existing international laws and 
enforcement in coping with the rise of Chinese SOEs, the challenges to improving Chinese corporate 
governance, and the underlying forces that form apparent similarities in elite composition across 
countries. 
 
I. Introduction 
  
China’s once dilapidated state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have grown into powerful 
giants.  After three decades of reform, China’s SOEs now comprise over 60 percent of the largest 
500 companies in China and more than 10 percent of Fortune Global 500 companies in the 
world.
1
   Pervasive state ownership continues with no sign of vanishing as a salient feature of 
Chinese corporate governance.   
When approaching China’s SOEs, scholars have typically measured their governance 
attributes against international standards of corporate governance and have generally come to a 
                                                          
 * Assistant Professor, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law Helpful comments on earlier drafts 
were received from Curtis Milhaupt, Bruce Carruthers, Martin Höpner, James Mahoney, Saskia Freye, David Stark, 
Josh Whitford, Gil Eyal as well as participants at Max Planck Summer Conference and workshops at the University 
of British Columbia Faculty Of Law and the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.   
1
 Global 500 2013, CNNMoney.com, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2013/full_list/ (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2013). 
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conclusion that the governance institutions are lacking or dysfunctional in China.
2
  This typical 
approach tends to focus on the function of things (i.e. rules and structures) and overlook the 
character of humans.  A philosophy underlying this approach is to seek corporate governance by 
the rule of law in lieu of the rule of man.  This approach promises a functional legal regime of 
corporate governance that can minimize arbitrariness exercised by human agents.  The flipside of 
this underlying philosophy, however, implies that the personal attributes of corporate leaders can 
play a significant role in affecting the quality of corporate governance—especially when legal 
institutions are weak, such as the case of China.  As a result, simply focusing on rules or 
structures without probing into leadership is an insufficient approach for grasping the full picture 
of the governance of China’s SOEs. 
The importance of leadership attributes in SOE governance is further complicated by the 
political institutions in China.  The Chinese state-owner is not an ordinary controlling 
shareholder.  The Chinese Communist Party is the real hand in the glove of state ownership in 
China.  As the single-ruling party, it controls all the important institutions in politics, business, 
media, academia, and every sphere of public life in China.  The chief control mechanism is the 
Party’s sophisticated but opaque personnel management over key positions in important 
institutions, including SOEs.
3
  As one commentator notes, “[t]he Party’s control over personnel 
was at the heart of its ability to overhaul state companies, without losing leverage over them at 
                                                          
2
 See Sonja Opper & Sylvia Schwaag-Serger, Institutional Analysis of Legal Change: The Case of Corporate 
Governance in China, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 245 (2008); Zhong Zhang, The Shareholder Derivative Action and 
Good Corporate Governance in China: Why the Excitement Is Actually for Nothing, 28 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 174 
(2011).  
3
 On the party personnel system generally see John P. Burns, Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership 
Selection: The 1990 Nomenklatura, 138 CHINA Q. 458 (1994); Hon S. Chen, Cadre Personnel Management in 
China: The Nomenklatura System 1990-1998, 179 CHINA Q. 703 (2004). 
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the same time.”4  The Party’s management of executives’ careers directly shapes managerial 
incentives and in turn influences the corporate behavior of China’s SOEs.   
Recent studies have insightfully suggested that the Party’s executive career management 
is a fundamental explanation for why many of Chinese SOEs’ practices diverge from the 
principles of corporate law or securities regulation.  For example, scholars have found that in 
addition to monetary executive compensation, political promotion acts as another important 
incentive mechanism to address the agency problems of China’s state-owned companies.5  
Moreover, empirical evidence shows that stock options granted to the executives of China’s 
state-owned companies are forged simply to fool foreign investors because such a compensation 
scheme is incompatible with China’s indigenous executive career management system.6  The 
institutionalized personnel rotations between China’s SOEs and other government units restrict 
the exercise of stock options, which can drastically enlarge the pay gap between the SOEs and 
the civil servant system.  Relatedly, Professor Katherina Pistor argues that in China’s financial 
industry the Party’s tight control over the financial cadre’s careers appears to be the dominant 
governance mechanism over ownership ties and legal rules.
7
 
Although scholarship to date has recognized that the Party’s control over executive 
careers plays a significant role in shaping the governance of China’s SOEs, the personnel 
management of the visible hand remains obscure to outsiders.
8
  A fundamental question 
                                                          
4
 RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA’S COMMUNIST RULERS 69 (2010). 
5
 See Jerry Cao, et al., Political Promotion, CEO Incentives, and the Relationship between Pay and Performance 
(Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr. Working Paper No. 11-53, 2011). 
6
 See Zhihong Chen et. al., Are Stock Option Grants to Directors of State-Controlled Chinese Firms Listed in Hong 
Kong Genuine Compensation?, ACCT. REV. (forthcoming).  
7
 Katharina Pistor, The Governance of China’s Finance, in CAPITALIZING CHINA 35 (Joseph P.H. Fan & Randall 
Morck eds., 2013).  
8
 A number of prominent sociologists have noted the business elite composition as an important but missing area of 
studies on Chinese corporate governance and national economy. See Andrew G. Walder, From Control to 
Ownership: China’s Managerial Revolution, 7 MGMT. ORG. REV. 19 (2009); Neil Fligstein & Jianjun Zhang, A New 
Agenda for Research on the Trajectory of Chinese Capitalism, 7 MGMT. ORG. REV. 39 (2009).  
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regarding the Party’s executive management is who the top managers really are.  Specifically, by 
which career pathways have the top managers of China’s SOEs come to power?  What kinds of 
attributes are advantageous and sought after in the executive labor market of China’s SOEs?  
How cohesive is the elite at the highest echelon of China’s largest companies?  How has 
executive recruitment evolved over time?  Have corporate governance reforms such as the 
introduction of the board of directors changed the executive composition?  From a perspective of 
comparative corporate governance, how do Chinese executives differ from their counterparts in 
other countries?  Is the composition of the Chinese business elite converging toward that of the 
shareholder-oriented model or the stakeholder-oriented model?  
Answering these questions requires a method for tracing the backgrounds and career 
paths of executives, briefly called an “executive-career approach” in this Article.  Following this 
approach, this Article conducts a systematic investigation of the biographies of the CEOs of 
China’s large non-financial SOEs between 2002 and 2010.9  The emphasis on CEOs assumes 
that the managerial culture of Chinese companies is highly hierarchical and paternalist, with 
decision-making power concentrated in the highest echelon of the corporate hierarchy.
10
  
Moreover, many large Chinese SOEs have not yet established a board of directors and the 
management power remains concentrated in the top leader (“yibashou”) of the corporate entity.  
The period of investigation (2002-2010) in this Article was chosen to evaluate the dynamics in 
executive composition under recent institutional reforms.  
                                                          
9
 Financial and non-financial SOEs are governed by different regulatory regimes in China. This Article is focused on 
non-financial SOEs. 
10
 C.J. Zhu et al., Development of HR Practices in Transitional Economies: Evidence from China, 19 INT’L J. 
HUMAN RES. MGMT. 840 (2008); S.H. Kong, An Empirical Investigation of Mainland Chinese Organizational 
Ideology, 5 ASIAN BUS. & MGMT. 357 (2006); GORDON REDDING & MICHAEL A. WITT, THE FUTURE OF CHINESE 
CAPITALISM: CHOICES AND CHANCES (2007); Michael A. Witt, China: What Variety of Capitalism? (INSEAD 
Working Paper, 2010).  
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Over the past decade, the Chinese government has introduced a variety of rules and 
guidelines that are supposed to professionalize and marketize executive recruitment.  These 
executive recruitment rules and guidelines help shed light on Chinese corporate governance, but 
they remain unexplored in the existing literature.  The executive recruitment guidelines provide a 
roadmap for identifying potential changes in executive attributes including educational 
credentials, political qualities, and career experience.  In addition to using the regulatory schemes 
as the basic analytical framework, this Article draws upon three sources of knowledge to analyze 
the empirical findings on executives’ educational, political, and career attributes.  The first 
source of information comes from China’s political and business organization history, which 
aims to provide a contextualized interpretation of the findings.  Because climbing to the top 
echelon of the corporate hierarchy usually takes decades, the contemporary elite composition is 
largely a consequence of institutional changes accumulated in the past.  The second source of 
knowledge derives from sociological theories which have been frequently used to explain career 
patterns and achievements.  In particular, this Article applies sociologist Ronald Burt’s idea of 
“brokerage and closure” in network theory to explain the comparative advantages of certain 
executive career pathways and the implications for Chinese corporate governance and the 
national economy.
11
  The third source of knowledge draws from executive career studies in the 
literature of comparative corporate governance.  The reference to comparative studies shows 
how Chinese executives differ from the executives of other corporate governance regimes.  The 
comparison helps to solve the puzzle of how China fits in the taxonomy of comparative 
corporate capitalism.
12
 
                                                          
11
 RONALD S. BURT, BROKERAGE AND CLOSURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL CAPITAL (2005). 
12
 Recent scholarship has been trying to understand how China fits in the standard comparative capitalism 
paradigms. Witt, supra note 10; Lin & Milhaupt, infra note 13.  
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With this analytical framework, this Article shows that China’s executive composition 
over the past decade indicates some stability and some change under institutional reforms.  And 
this combination of stability and change has mixed signals for Chinese corporate governance 
development.  On the whole, executive recruitment is oriented toward politically-bounded and 
firm-specific-knowledge professionalism and indicates a potential trend of bottom-up and 
competition-pressure-driven marketization.  It is a system that strongly favors insiders over 
outsiders and presents a high degree of closure and cohesion.  While high elite cohesion may be 
helpful to national policy implementation, it poses challenges to corporate governance 
improvement due to an increased tendency of groupthink and perpetuation of old practices, 
which usually undermine the implementation of governance reforms envisioned in the corporate 
law.  Moreover, through the comparative analysis of the business elite, this Article finds that 
China looks similar to countries of the stakeholder-oriented model and obviously different from 
the shareholder-oriented model.  However, the apparent similarities in the elite composition 
among China and countries of the stakeholder-oriented model are probably formed by different 
country-specific underlying causes. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Section II gives a brief description of the ownership 
and governance structure of China’s large non-financial SOEs.  It provides an organizational 
blueprint to contextualize executive recruitment practices and to construct the executive career 
pathways discussed in the following sections.  Section III discusses the executive recruitment 
reform rules over the past decade and the implied changes in executive attributes.  Section IV 
traces how executives may have come to power by constructing six types of career pathways 
based on organizational structure and relational distance.  This Article hypothesizes the potential 
development patterns of each career pathway under institutional reforms and discusses the 
Draft: Forthcoming in Columbia Business Law Review  
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corporate governance and individual career attainment implications of each career pathway.  
Section V empirically examines the evolution of executive attributes under formal institutional 
reforms. It draws upon the specific institutional setting, social network theory, and comparative 
corporate governance literature to analyze the empirical findings.  Section VI concludes with the 
legal implications for international regulators as well as the challenges and future research 
directions of executive recruitment and corporate governance in China. 
II. The Organization and Governance of China’s SOEs 
 China’s large state-owned non-financial enterprises are typically organized as vertically-
integrated corporate groups.  Each corporate group has a holding company (known as “core 
company”) standing at the top of the ownership hierarchy.  The Chinese state-owned non-
financial companies on the Fortune Global 500 list, such as China National Petroleum 
Corporation, China Mobile Communication Corporation and China Datang Corporation, are all 
the core company of a corporate group.  Below the core company are a large number of 
subsidiaries including listed companies, finance companies, research institutes, and many other 
related firms along the production chain.
13
  The ultimate controlling shareholder of the core 
company in the corporate group is an ownership agency of the central or local government 
known as the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (“SASAC”).  
Other than the central SASAC, there presently are 31 SASACs at the provincial level and 331 at 
the lower-government levels.
14
  The core company acts as an intermediary between SASAC and 
group firms that engage in production. This Article focuses on executive recruitment of the core 
company in the corporate group.    
                                                          
13
 For a detailed analysis of the corporate group structure in China see Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We are the 
(National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. (2013). 
14
 Unless specifically referring to “the central SASAC” or “the local SASACs”, this Article simply uses “SASAC” 
to refer generally to this type of ownership agency in the Chinese government system. 
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 SASAC, established in 2003, is legally tasked with consolidating the shareholder control 
rights formerly dispersed among various government agencies.
15
  In practice, SASAC’s 
controlling shareholder status is often overshadowed by the persistent old power structure.  
SASAC’s appointment right is eclipsed by a deep-rooted institutional practice in China––that is, 
the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party controls the human resources 
management of all the important organizations, including SOEs.
16
  As a result, SASAC and the 
Party’s Organization Department often jointly release executive management regulations and 
personnel announcements. 
In cooperation with the Party’s Organization Department, SASAC has introduced many 
regulatory rules stated to improve the quality of SOE executive teams.  In 2008, the Chinese 
government passed landmark legislation on SOE governance, the Law on State-Owned Assets of 
Enterprises (“SOE Assets Law”).17  The SOE Assets Law formally defines how SASAC, as the 
agency authorized to exercise controlling shareholder rights, should manage SOE matters like 
executive personnel management.  
According to the SOE Assets Law, SASAC can appoint and evaluate the SOE’s directors 
and top managers, including CEOs, vice CEOs, CFOs and other executives.
18
  This appointment 
authority blatantly strips away the most important power of the board of directors––selecting and 
evaluating top managers.  SASAC officially advocates corporate governance reform in the form 
of establishing SOE boards of directors.  However, the SOE Assets Law, coupled with other 
related regulations, bears virtually no sign that SASAC (and, ultimately, the Party) has any intent 
                                                          
15
 For a brief discussion on the role of SASAC, see Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 13, 734-745. 
16
 See, e.g. Burns, supra note 2, at 462-63.  
17
 [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2008, effective May 1, 2009) 2008 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
GAZ. XXX (China) (“SOE Assets Law”).  
18
 Article 22, SOE Assets Law.  The core companies of the large state-owned business groups in China are typically 
100% owned by the national or local government with SASAC exercising the shareholder control rights. 
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to relinquish authority to appoint the top positions in the most important business enterprises.
19
  
Lack of the ability to use appointment authority as a monitoring weapon raises doubts that an 
SOE board of directors can play any meaningful role in improving the quality of executive 
management teams.  Observers note that, even with the appearance of boards of directors, the 
Party truly orchestrates SOE governance in China.
20
 
III. Institutional Reforms and Executive Recruitment 
Since 2003, the SASAC and the Party’s Organization Department have introduced rules 
and guidelines stated to improve the quality of SOE executive teams.  These executive reform 
policies aim to professionalize executive teams and open the executive labor market.
21
  As 
executive recruitment reforms proceed, the composition of the business elite may change. This 
Section discusses how professionalization and marketization reforms may cause changes in three 
dimensions: political attributes, educational backgrounds, and career pathways.  Section IV 
discusses career pathways in-depth, due to the topic’s complexity.  
Professionalization. State ownership often raises concerns over politics overriding 
professionalism.  Seniority, personal connections (“guanxi”), and political loyalty are important 
                                                          
19
 “In 2008, [the central] SASAC and the Organization Department of the Communist Party promulgated Guidance 
Opinions on Top Manager Appointments by the Board of Directors of Central Enterprises.  These Opinions for the 
first time gave some appointment power to boards.   However, the CEOs of the top fifty-three central enterprises are 
not covered by the Opinions.  Even with respect to other enterprises, the nomination committee of the board is 
required to ‘fully consult’ with the Party Committee and SASAC before nominating a CEO.  The preliminary 
appointment must be filed with SASAC before the appointment becomes final.”  Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 13, at 
739 n.122.  
20
 See Nicholas Howson, China’s Restructured Commercial Banks: Nomenklatura Accountability Serving Corporate 
Governance Reform?, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS: CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL IMPACT 123, 140 
(stating that, despite the use of boards of directors, the Party Committee, which is subject to control of the Party 
system, is the “real power” in China’s largest state-owned commercial banks) (Zhu Min, Cai Jinqing & Martha 
Avery eds., 2009); Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 13 at 737 (noting that SASAC exercises its power to select and 
compensate top managers “in the shadow of party control”).  
21
 Rather than reviewing in detail each regulatory scheme on executive recruitment, this Article gives a summary of 
key points from the relevant rules.  See, e.g. Provisional Rules on Corporate Leaders of Central SOEs (2009); 
Provisional Measures on Comprehensive Evaluation of Corporate Leadership Teams and Leaders of Central SOEs 
(2009); Guidance on Public Recruitments for Senior Managers of Central SOEs (2004).  Local SASACs also have 
similar rules.  
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factors in job chances and promotion opportunities in China, especially for state-affiliated 
organizations like SOEs.
22
  This Section addresses the dimension in which professionalization 
reforms would take place and how these factors would subsequently change. 
SASAC executive reform rules suggest that professionalization will occur in a politically 
bounded fashion because political allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party remains a 
paramount quality in selecting and evaluating top managers of China’s SOEs.23  The corporate 
governance system fortifies the political quality control.  Chinese SOEs have two parallel 
systems in personnel management: the regular corporate management system and the party 
system.
24
 Corporate management system positions, similar to those commonly found in firms 
elsewhere, include CEO, vice CEO, chief accountant, and––if the company has a board of 
directors––board chairman and independent board members.  Party system leadership teams 
includes the secretary (and several deputy secretaries) of the party committee, a secretary of the 
discipline inspection commission (an anticorruption office), and other members of the party 
committee.  Formal policy overlapping the party and corporate leadership teams dictates that a 
corporate manager of a given rank typically holds a position of equivalent rank in the party 
system.
25
  The link between the corporate and party leadership teams aims to ensure consistency 
                                                          
22
 See Andrew G. Walder, Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 309, 309 (1995) 
(discussing the communist party’s role in executive promotion within China’s divided career path system, and 
noting that the path that considers political credintials leads to positions with greater authority and more material 
privileges than the path that only considers educational credentials); See also Yanjie Bian, Getting a Job Through a 
Web of “Guanxi” in China, in NETWORKS IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: LIFE IN CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITIES [pin, 
pin] (Barry Wellman ed., 1999). 
23
 Article 4(1), Provisional Rules on Corporate Leaders of Central SOEs (2009); Provisional Measures on 
Comprehensive Evaluation of Corporate Leadership Teams and Leaders of Central SOEs (2009). 
24
 Article 9, Provisional Rules on Corporate Leaders of Central SOEs (2009). 
25
 “In 2004, the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party and the Party Committee of SASAC 
released Guanyu Jiaqiang he Gaijin Zhongyang Qiyedang Jian Gongzuo de Yijian (<chinese law name>) [Opinions 
Concerning Strengthening and Improving the Party Construction Work in the Central Enterprises] (promulgated by 
the Org. Dep’t Communist Party of China & Party Comm. SASAC, Oct. 31, 2004).  A key principle of the Opinions 
is the policy of ‘bilateral entries and cross appointments.’  The term bilateral entries means that members of the 
Party Committee can serve on the board of directors, the supervisory board, and the top management team, while 
board members and top managers who are party members can join the Party Committee.  The term cross 
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between corporate decision-making and party policy.  Political loyalty to the Chinese 
Communist Party as a primary requirement suggests that the Party has no intention to relinquish 
control over the largest economic organizations in China.  Professionalism is unlikely to touch 
on areas requiring or triggering sensitive political reforms.  Rather, permissible reforms are 
expected to occur in less politically sensitive areas such as age, education, specialization, work 
experience, and moral integrity, as envisioned in SASAC’s executive reform guidance.26   
Part of the professionalization scheme is to bring young managers into, and retire old 
managers out of, the leadership teams.
27
 Young managers are desirable because they may be 
more active and innovative, and less influenced by old traditions. The professionalization reform 
also sets educational requirements. As academic credentials are an approximate indicator of 
intellectual ability, the executive reform rules require executives to have a minimum of a 
bachelor’s degree.28 Moreover, while Chinese elites have traditionally been trained in 
engineering,
29
 non-engineering-trained executives are expected to be on the rise as the division 
of labor becomes complex in large business organizations.  
In terms of career experience, organizations should prefer business-related work 
experience over political career experience. In the old days, China’s SOEs were managed 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
appointments means that, if the company has a board of directors, the secretary of the Party Committee and the 
board chair can be assumed to be the same person. If the company does not have a board of directors, then the 
secretary of the Party Committee can be assumed to be the CEO, and the vice-CEO can be assumed to be the deputy 
secretary of the Party Committee.”  Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 13, at 737 n.118 (citation omitted).  
26
 See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.  
27
 In December 2004, the central SASAC issued a regulatory order to the most important 53 central SOEs regarding 
the mandatory retirement age of the top managers. According to the order, the ministerial-rank managers were 
strictly required to retire upon reaching the age of 65 and the vice-ministerial-rank managers upon reaching the age 
of 60. Local SASACs made even more aggressive requirements. For example, according to the Provisional Rules on 
Corporate Leaders of SOEs under Heifei City SASAC, the chief-position executives such as the board chairman and 
CEO should not exceed the age of 50, and the vice-position executives such as vice-CEO should not exceed 45 years 
old. The reappointed chief-position executives should not exceed the age of 55 and the reappointed vice-position 
executives should not be older than 52.       
28
 Article 5, Provisional Rules on Corporate Leaders of Central SOEs (2009).  
29
 CHENG LI, CHINA’S LEADERS: THE NEW GENERATION 37, 40 (2001) (noting that, of the college-educated Chinese 
elites who received promotions in the 1980s, most were trained in engineering and natural sciences, including 78.3% 
of ministers and vice ministers in 1988 and 74.6% of mayors in 1986). 
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similarly to other government units, and incompatibly with modern business management. To 
address this concern, SASAC’s reform rules require executives to have at least ten years of work 
experience in business organizations.
30
  Besides the general requirements of age, education, and 
work experience, moral integrity is a specific quality that needs significant improvement. 
Because China’s SOEs have been plagued by corruption, executive reform policies repeatedly 
emphasize that executives should have rectitude, a law-abiding nature, and a good public 
image.
31
  
Marketization. The SOE executive headhunting process, from beginning to end, used to 
take place in complete darkness. Job information and opportunities were available only to people 
inside the system. As a result, applicants perpetuated old habits because they lacked access to 
new management skills. To address this problem, the central and local SASACs, with the Party’s 
endorsement, have openly solicited job applications for hundreds of executive positions since 
2003.
32
  These positions include CEOs, vice CEOs, and chief accountants (equivalent to CFOs) 
of the core companies under their supervision. Those who are interested in the executive 
openings may submit their applications and go through paper-based qualification reviews, 
standardized written examinations, and face-to-face interviews.
33
 This executive headhunting 
targets not only China’s domestic labor market, but also overseas talent. The political, 
educational, and work experience requirements discussed above are relaxed for executives 
recruited from overseas through this process.
34
 In 2010, thirty-one senior managers of central 
                                                          
30
 Article 5, Provisional Rules on Corporate Leaders of Central SOEs (2009).  
31
 Articles 1, Provisional Rules on Corporate Leaders of Central SOEs (2009); Provisional Measures on 
Comprehensive Evaluation of Corporate Leadership Teams and Leaders of Central SOEs (2009); Regulations on 
Honest and Ethical Business Practice Behavior of SOE Corporate Leaders (2009). 
32
 SASAC’s Press Release on Central State-Owned Enterprises’ Public Recruitment for Top Managers, June 14, 
2006. 
33
 Guidance on Public Recruitments for Senior Managers of Central SOEs (2004). 
34
 Articles 6, Provisional Rules on Corporate Leaders of Central SOEs (2009). 
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SOEs, out of 1,410 applicants worldwide, were successfully recruited through this process.
35
 
This new recruitment strategy is praised by the Chinese government as a process of “openness, 
fairness, competitiveness, and meritocracy.”36  
In theory, marketization of the recruitment process suggests that political affiliation with 
the Chinese Communist Party (the “Party”) may become a less important factor for executives 
recruited through this process because the value of professional experience accumulated outside 
the state system may compensate for a lack of political affiliation.  In other words, it opens up 
opportunities for outsiders—professionals who build up their careers in private or foreign 
companies—to parachute directly onto the top of the SOE system.  This public recruitment 
process also suggests a potential increase in the number of executives who have been educated 
abroad.  
IV. A Typology of Executive Career Pathways 
 
 Tracing executive career pathways is a useful method to investigate how executives have 
come to power and what aspects of career experience have changed under the professionalization 
and marketization reforms. This Article constructs six types of career pathways based on the 
prevailing organizational structures of China’s SOEs and the organizational distance between the 
SOE of concern and the organizations that the executive has worked for prior to being appointed 
CEO.  The distance is defined by whether the prior organization is related to the concerned SOE 
in terms of supervisory authority in the government system and whether the prior organization is 
an institution outside the state system (i.e., private or foreign companies). Organizations that fall 
outside the supervisory line or the state system are considered more distant from the SOE in 
                                                          
35
 Press Release, The First Bureau of Corporate Leader Management of SASAC of the State Council (April 1, 2011) 
(on file with author).   
36
 Press Release,  Recruitment decisions by SASAC of the State Council, May 10, 2005, Aug 28, 2006, and May 22, 
2007. 
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question.  This typology allows for evaluation of the degree of personnel integration between 
SOEs and other government units, as well as the degrees of professionalization and openness of 
the executive labor market.  Based on this typology, this Article proposes the features of each 
career pathway in securing the CEO position and the implications for corporate governance. 
Moreover, rather than simply focusing on how CEOs came to power, this Article considers what 
they do after leaving their executive positions. Tracking the post-CEO status helps get a more 
complete picture of the degree of SOE personnel integration with other government units.  
Furthermore, analyzing post-CEO status helps to better understand managerial incentives and 
evaluate the role of the legal system in punishing top managers’ illegal behavior. 
A. Pathways to CEO 
The Single-Group Track. China’s large non-financial SOEs are typically organized as 
corporate groups registered with the state.
37
 A corporate group is legally required to be 
comprised of a parent company and at least five controlled subsidiaries. When an executive spent 
his or her whole career within one corporate group before being appointed CEO of that group, 
the executive’s career follows a single-group track.   
The single-group track is based on climbing the corporate ladder from the bottom to the 
top. If this track is the mainstream route, it suggests that a group-based seniority system operates 
to select the top managers of China’s SOEs.  According to social network theory, executives 
coming to the top through the single-group pathway possess a high volume of firm-specific 
knowledge and insider network resources.
38
 When firm-specific knowledge is valued and insider 
                                                          
37
 Provisional Rules on Business Registration (1998). In order to form a group, the parent company must have 
registered capital of at least 50 million RMB (about $7.5 million) and at least five subsidiaries. The total registered 
capital of the parent and its subsidiaries must be at least 100 million RMB ($15 million). 
38
  For the early leading literature in explaining the importance of social networks to job opportunities see generally 
MARK GRANOVETTER, GETTING A JOB: A STUDY OF CONTACTS AND CAREERS (2d ed.1995) (arguing that the best 
jobs are found through personal contacts and developing a causal model to explain the acquisiton of job information 
through personal contacts).  
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social connections are important, managers following the single-group track have great 
advantages in attempting to reach the CEO position. From a corporate governance perspective, 
the single-group track assures some professionalism due to the CEO’s possession of rich firm-
specific knowledge. However, it also presents an increased risk of excessive power concentration, 
especially given that the board of directors is usually dysfunctional (or absent) as an internal 
monitoring mechanism and China’s external governance institutions remain weak.  
The Multi-Group Track. This career pathway refers to a route in which the executive has 
worked in other state-owned business groups prior to CEO appointment. At first brush, the SOE 
executives following the multi-group track look similar to those changing jobs across employers 
in other executive labor markets. But unlike other labor markets normally governed by the 
invisible hand, China’s SOE executive market is centrally managed by the party-state. Thus, job 
movements across organizations are not as free as in other labor markets. Leaving aside personal 
reasons for job change across organizations, an important institutional reason for forming the 
multi-group track is the party-state’s personnel rotation management system.  
Personnel rotation is a legally institutionalized system in managing civil servants in the 
Chinese government units; because the boundary between the government units and SOEs is 
porous, the system in practice spills over into SOEs.
39
 The party-state frequently rotates top 
managers across business groups of the same industry.  For example, in April 2011, the state-
owner rotated the CEOs of the three central petroleum SOEs in China, each of which is a Fortune 
Global 500 company. In the eyes of the party-state, executive rotations perform two institutional 
functions. First, given that institutionalized corporate oversight organs such as the board of 
directors have yet to be fully developed, executive rotations can help reduce excessive 
                                                          
39
 According to the Provisional Measures on Rotations of Civil Servants, enacted in 1996 and still effective today, a 
civil servant who has served in a leadership position for five or more years should rotate.  According to the 
regulation, personnel rotation facilitates operation efficiency and prevents corruption. 
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concentration of managerial power in a business group.  Second, personnel rotations facilitate 
management skills sharing among SOEs.
40
  Personnel rotations allow executives who gained 
useful skills in one business group to share such experience with another group. For instance, 
one purported reason for Mr. Chengyu Fu’s rotation from CNOONC to Sinopec in the recent 
CEO rotations among China’s three petroleum giants is that Mr. Fu’s rich overseas business 
experience from CNOONC can alleviate Sinopec’s frustrations with overseas expansion. 41 
The Supervisory-Bureau Track.  A SOE executive comes to power through the 
supervisory-bureau pathway when the executive develops his or her career mainly in the SOE’s 
supervisory bureau(s).  China’s large SOEs were carved out of industry-based government 
ministries or bureaus in the corporatization process, which transformed governmental organs into 
joint-stock companies.  These corporatized SOEs remain supervised by government ministries 
(bureaus) in terms of industrial matters.  Because of the historical integration in organizational 
structures and the continuing supervisory relationships in business, personnel exchanges between 
the SOEs and their supervisory bureaus are quite frequent.
42
  Government officials can gain firm-
specific knowledge and build social connections with employees in the supervised SOEs through 
supervisory relations.  In addition, supervisory government officials tend to have industry-wide 
information and social connections.  This social and informational capital can increase the 
usefulness of the supervisory-bureau track in securing executive positions.   
 Anecdotal evidence indicates that many government officials take top-echelon positions 
in SOEs in preparation for retirement.  Transferring to an SOE is economically attractive because 
the large SOEs usually offer better monetary compensation than other government units.  It is 
                                                          
40
 Pistor, supra note 7 (making the same point for the managerial rotations among the state-owned financial 
institutions in China).  
41
 Yiming Zhang, Sinopec and CNOOC Welcome New Heads, Top Leader Rotations Facilitate Cooperation, CHINA 
ECON. TIMES, April 11, 2011. 
42
 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 13.  
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especially practicable for senior officials in the supervisory bureaus to adopt this retirement 
strategy because they have accumulated relevant social and knowledge capital.  Due to the late-
stage nature of retirement, executives coming through the supervisory-bureau pathway are 
expected to be senior in age.  This retirement pattern, in fact, is not unique to China.  In Japan, 
there is an institutionalized practice known as amakudari, where senior bureaucrats retire to join 
private companies or SOEs linked with or under the jurisdiction of their ministries or agencies 
when they reach mandatory retirement age, usually between 50 and 60.
43
  Such personnel 
practices in Japan have often been criticized as corrupt and obstructive to regulatory reforms.
44
  
The implication from the Japanese experience for China’s SOEs seems to be that the 
supervisory-bureau pathway should be restricted in order to further executive professionalization 
and corporate governance reform. 
The Unrelated-Government-Units Track.  An executive follows the unrelated-
government-units track when the executive’s career mainly develops in government-affiliated 
organs other than for-profit SOEs and supervisory bureaus prior to CEO appointment.  Such 
government units are relatively irrelevant to the focused SOE in terms of the type of 
organizational identity or the nature of business matters.  For example, Mr. Biting Chen first 
worked his way up in the Party system to become the Party Secretary of the Youth League 
Committee of Anhui Province.  He later became the mayor of a city in Jiangsu Province, chief 
secretary of Jiangsu Province, and later became the vice-governor of the province.   Finally, he 
was appointed as the CEO of Shenhua Group, one of the largest energy SOEs in China and also a 
                                                          
43
 Ulrike Schaede, The "Old Boy" Network and Government-Business Relationships in Japan, 21 J. JAPANESE STUD. 
293, 293 (1995). See generally Richard A. Colignon & Chikako Usui, AMAKUDARI: THE HIDDEN FABRIC OF 
JAPAN’S ECONOMY (2003).  
44
 See, e.g., Lonney E. Carlile & Mark C. Tilton, Is Japan Really Changing?, in IS JAPAN REALLY CHANGING ITS 
WAYS? REGULATORY REFORM AND THE JAPANESE ECONOMY, 197, 197-218 (Lonney E. Carlile & Mark C. Tilton 
eds., 1998); Elizabeth Norville, The 'Illiberal' Roots of Japanese Financial Regulatory Reform, in IS JAPAN REALLY 
CHANGING ITS WAYS? REGULATORY REFORM AND THE JAPANESE ECONOMY, 111, 111-14 (Carlile & Tilton eds., 
1998).  
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Fortune Global 500 company.  Executives with this career pathway tend to possess more skills in 
political operation than firm-specific or industry-specific knowledge.  If the unrelated-
government-units track is the prevailing career pathway, it suggests the management logic of 
China’s SOEs is oriented more toward political than business purposes.  Under 
professionalization reform, the unrelated-government-units track will likely decline in use. 
The Multi-Sphere Track.  A SOE executive comes to power through the multi-sphere 
track when an executive’s career spans multiple types of organizations such as unaffiliated SOEs, 
supervisory bureaus, and other unrelated government units.  For example, Mr. Shulin Su first 
worked his way from an entry-level technician of a subsidiary up to the vice CEO position in the 
core company of Sinopec Group (a giant petroleum SOE).  He was then transferred to the Party 
Standing Committee of Liaoning Province and was later appointed as the CEO of China National 
Petroleum Corporation, one of the largest oil companies in China.  This type of career pathway is 
essentially a combination of the previous four types.  Compared to the single-group executives, 
multi-sphere executives are more likely to have system-wide knowledge and diverse personal 
connections, which can be an advantage in career advancement.  The prevalence of the multi-
sphere track would suggest high personnel integration between SOEs and other government units.  
This phenomenon may be detrimental to corporate governance because the SOEs would be at a 
higher risk of being managed in a way similar to other government units.  Nevertheless, the 
multi-sphere track may create greater elite cohesion through shared career experiences among 
political and business leaders, which can facilitate economic coordination and policy 
implementation at the national level.  
The System-Outsider Track.  All the career pathways discussed so far meander strictly 
within the boundaries of the state system.  Executives travelling on these pathways are system 
Draft: Forthcoming in Columbia Business Law Review  
19 
 
insiders, savvy with the operation of the state system.  In contrast, system outsiders accumulate 
their career experiences in organizations unaffiliated with the state such as private or foreign 
companies.  
Unlike system insiders embedded in a closed network, system outsiders have brokerage 
ties of connectivity outside the state system that provide access to new ideas and resources.
45
  
Executives coming from the system-outsider path are institutional brokers importing new 
management knowledge into the SOEs which tend to be trapped in an outdated mentality.  The 
participation of system outsiders in the SOE system presents a good sign of improvement in 
corporate governance. 
While system outsiders can use their brokerage advantages to break into the SOE system 
and win the top management positions, it is uncertain whether these advantages can overcome 
the “liability of foreignness” – the competitive disadvantages of foreigners when entering into a 
local system.
46
  China’s SOEs have a strict hierarchy of ranks in employee administration, which 
parallels the government’s civil service administration.  It is a persistent tradition despite several 
attempts to abolish it in the past.  A system outsider’s parachuting onto an executive post would 
disrupt internal promotion expectations based on administrative ranks.  It would also cause a 
legitimacy problem when diverging from institutionalized expectations.  Moreover, system 
outsiders often lack local personal connections such as guanxi to gain access to job information 
and opportunities of the state-affiliated organizations.  As a result, system outsiders may need to 
build up outstanding external reputations in professionalism in order to overcome their liability 
of foreignness.  
                                                          
45
 For the leading analysis of the idea about brokerage ties outside a closed system see Burt, supra note 11. In a 
simple sense, brokerage means connection between two or more unrelated agents or groups. 
46
 The term of “liability of foreignness” is commonly used in business literature. It refers to foreign firms that are 
less competitive compared to local firms when entering into a local market. 
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SASAC’s marketization reform of the SOE executive labor market is expected to recruit 
more executives from the system-outsider path, particularly in industries where competition 
depends on innovation and efficiency.  Competition pressures may increase the likelihood of 
breaks with conformity with old recruitment practices and the adoption of new strategies.
47
  But 
due to suspicion of outsiders, the system-outsider track may be less likely to occur in industries 
of critical national security.  Rather, the Chinese SOEs that are likely to embrace system 
outsiders tend to be in industries relatively open to the private sector such as steel, automobile 
manufacturing, and light industries.    
B. Post-CEO Career Development 
The government’s executive recruitment guidelines set forth not only criteria for 
selecting SOE executive candidates but also standards for removing executives.  The grounds for 
dismissal include, for example, failing to meet performance targets in the absence of objective 
causes, reaching mandatory retirement age, having health problems, committing serious violation 
of law such as corruption, or undertaking other job responsibilities.
48
  The dismissal standards 
raise questions about post-CEO career development, which is an important dimension of the 
executive personnel system.  For instance, what types of CEOs are more likely to step down due 
to legal liabilities?  Is there any path-dependent effect—i.e. staying in the same pathway after the 
CEO post—in the executive training system of China’s SOEs?  The existence of path-dependent 
effects signals some predictability in how the state-owner manages its top managers while the 
absence increases the complexity of understanding the executive training system.  
As explained previously, the single-group track CEO has firm-specific knowledge and 
insider social connections.  This intellectual and social capital can help not only to secure the 
                                                          
47
 Christine Oliver, The Antecedents of Deinstitutionalization, 13 ORG. STUD. 563, 574 (1992).  
48
 Chapter 8, Provisional Rules on Corporate Leaders of Central SOEs (2009). 
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CEO position but also other leadership positions in the same group, such as the chairmanship of 
the board.  Thus, the single-group CEO may be likely to stay in the same group after leaving the 
CEO position.  If so, there is a path-dependent effect in the single-group track on later career 
development.  Similarly, the multi-group track and the unrelated-government-units track may 
also have path-dependent effects as CEOs of these types possess intellectual and social capital 
across multiple groups or spheres, which may give them advantages in moving across spheres in 
the government system.  The path-dependent effect may also happen in the supervisory-bureau 
track.  However, since CEOs of the supervisory-bureau track tend to be senior in age, retirement 
would be another common career outcome.  
The post-CEO status of the system-outsider track is uncertain.  It may depend on how the 
system-outsider survives in the state system.  Anecdotal evidence suggests system-outsider 
managers often leave the SOEs very soon after arrival due to poor acclimation to the state system.  
Because system-outsiders often quickly retreat from the SOE system, it poses a great challenge 
to efforts to improve SOE governance through reliance on external human resources.  
Finally, in addition to staying in the same path or switching to a different trajectory, the 
post-CEO career development can be disrupted and miserable.  As discussed in Section III, 
corruption control is a major theme in executive reform schemes.  The Chinese party-state has 
the power not only to promote CEOs to other, higher positions in the government system but also 
to punish them severely through its judiciary machinery.  While the probability of ending up in 
jail seems low, the possibility remains quite real as evidenced in a number of recent cases where 
high-profile executives of China’s leading SOEs were ousted and presented with serious criminal 
liabilities related to their executive duties.
49
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 Prominent cases include: Tonghai Chen, the former CEO of Sinopec Group, was sentenced to death penalty for 
corruption by the Beijing's Second Intermediate People's Court in July 2009; Rixin Kong, the former CEO of China 
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Because career outcomes are often an accumulation of previous experiences, CEOs 
coming to power through different career pathways may be at different risks of criminal behavior 
such as corruption.  For example, an intuitive concern of corporate governance is that the 
unrelated-government-units track may be more likely to produce corrupt CEOs due to their more 
politics-tainted backgrounds and lack of business management experience.  In this regard, the 
single-group track with its rich, firm-specific knowledge may seem less problematic.  However, 
the single-group track may still be susceptible to corruption because it may have the problem of 
excessive concentration of authority and power abuse, especially when there is no effective 
internal monitoring mechanism such as a board of directors. 
V. Rules and Realities: Empirical Analysis 
Sections III and IV above propose the potential changes to current executive recruitment 
reforms. But as always in China, formal institutional reforms do not guarantee actual changes.  
To assess the real development of China’s SOE executive recruitment under the institutional 
reforms, this section examines the CEO biographic backgrounds of the SOEs among the largest 
500 companies (by revenue) in China, according to annual ranking by the China Enterprise 
Confederation and China Enterprise Directors Association.  More than 60% of the largest 500 
companies in China are SOEs.  An advantage of this ranking is that it takes into account the fact 
that large enterprises in China are organized as business groups in which core companies control 
a large number of subsidiaries including listed firms.  The CEOs of the core companies in the 
large state-owned business groups are the focus of this section.  In order to track the effects of 
the institutional reforms over the past decade, this section examines data of  three years (2002, 
2005, and 2010) spanning a period before and after major reform measures.  The graph in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
National Nuclear Corporation, was sentenced to life in prison for corruption by the Beijing’s First Intermediate 
People’s Court in November 2011.  
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Appendix I illustrates the sequence of the data years and the important institutional reform events 
discussed in Sections II and III.  The CEO biographic information is manually collected from 
multiple sources including corporate prospectuses, annual reports, corporate websites, 
government documents and websites, industrial association websites, and news reports.  After 
excluding missing data, the sample size of CEO biographical profiles is 272 in 2002, 274 in 2005 
and 273 in 2010.
50
  The total sample includes 612 distinct CEO profiles. 
A. Descriptive CEO Attributes 
 [Table 1] summarizes the descriptive attributes and patterns of change in education, 
political affiliation and career pathways from 2002 to 2010. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The data show that the professionalism reforms have had noticeable effect in the 
educational dimension.  The percentage of the CEOs with a graduate degree significantly 
increased from 37.5% in 2002 to 57.1% in 2010.  The percentage of the CEOs with a foreign 
degree also rose, albeit only slightly, to 4.4% in 2010.  Those with foreign study experience 
usually received their degrees from academic institutions in the United States.  Regarding 
academic discipline, more than 60% of the CEOs were still trained in engineering, representing a 
slow diversification in specialization areas.  The dominance of engineering-trained CEOs is a 
result of China’s industrial structure and political history.  The Chinese government has been 
aggressively seeking technological upgrades to move up the value chain.  This technological 
advancement cannot be achieved by financial or marketing management.  Moreover, when 
China’s education was battered by the storms of Maoism, engineering was a politically safer 
field of study than most.  These factors increased the tendency of students to study engineering.  
As to elite school education, while the number of the CEOs who graduated from the C9 League 
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(a.k.a. the Ivy League of China)
51
 declined to 11.4% in 2010 from 15.8% in 2002, the Tsinghua 
alumni network expanded, accounting for 5.5% in 2010.  Thus, while the elite school network 
has shrunk overall, it has simultaneously become more concentrated in Tsinghua, the leading 
engineering school in China. 
Regarding political membership, the data show that in 2010 more than 80% of the CEOs 
were members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  This number is significantly higher than 
the overall employee party membership rate (around 30%) throughout the SOE corporate 
hierarchy.
52
  While it may seem that CCP membership has declined, this is an unsupported 
interpretation given the increase in unknown/missing data.
53
  The CCP-affiliated executives 
joined the Party at a quite early age, around 25 or 26.  This suggests an early pledge of political 
loyalty is helpful for later career development in the state system.  Early party membership 
signals a higher degree of political commitment and also allows for a prolonged process of 
scrutiny, cultivation, and training, which increase the likelihood of subsequent promotion into 
elite positions.
54
  While most of the CEOs are CCP members, a very minimal number of the 
remaining CEOs are affiliated with another political party, the China National Democratic 
Construction Association, which is an ally of the CCP.  The marginal representation of non-CCP 
party members in the SOE elite adds more symbolic than real importance of political diversity in 
the SOE system.   
                                                          
51
 C9 League, formed in 1998, is an alliance of nine prestigious universities handpicked by the Chinese government, 
including Fudan University, Harbin Institute of Technology, Nanjing University, Peking University, Shanghai Jiao 
Tong University, Tsinghua University, University of Science and Technology of China, Xi'an Jiao Tong University 
and Zhejiang University. 
52
 SASAC, CHINA’S STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION YEARBOOK (2010) (one-third of 
the employees in the national SOEs are members of the Party; as of the end of 2009, 3.03 million of the 9.36 million 
employees of the central SOEs were party members).  
53
 When a CEO’s party affiliation cannot be clearly identified in the multiple information sources, the political 
affiliation of the CEO is coded as unknown. 
54
 Bobai Li & Andrew G. Walder, Career Advancement as Party Patronage: Sponsored Mobility into the Chinese 
Administrative Elite, 1949-1996, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1371, 1395 (2001). 
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In addition to the predominance of CCP affiliation, the executive personnel integration 
into China’s political system seems to be on the rise. The Chinese government has an 
institutionalized practice in selecting top managers into its representative national political 
bodies including the National People’s Congress (the government’s symbolic legislative body), 
the National People’s Political Consultative Conference (an advisory body composed of 
representatives of different social and political groups) and the National Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party (the Party’s general assembly). While members usually lack substantive power, 
memberships in such political bodies represent a social/political status or a mark of legitimacy 
recognized by the party-state.  The data show that the number of CEOs who were members of 
these national political bodies increased from 8.1% in 2002 to 19.4% in 2010. The increased 
representation suggests the growing importance of the SOEs in China’s national political system, 
but it also deepens the concern about the SOE management’s autonomy in terms of corporate 
governance. Overall, the political attributes here confirm that political loyalty to the CCP 
remains a paramount requirement and the SOE executive personnel has become more integrated 
into the national political bodies. The rising political integration diverges from the principle of 
separation SOEs from the government declared in many Chinese corporate governance reform 
laws.
55
     
Next, turning to career attributes, the CEOs on average came to power when they were 
around 46 years old—relatively young compared to executives in other corporate governance 
regimes.
56
 This junior CEO phenomenon confirms the party-state’s executive professionalization 
rules as discussed in Section III – intentionally to appoint young executives, who are more 
enthusiastic and less constrained by old traditions.  “Technician” has been the most common 
                                                          
55
  See, e.g. Law on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises Art. 6 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2008, effective May 1, 2009) P.R.C. Laws.  
56
  See infra Part V.B. 
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initial job title in the CEOs’ careers, though it has declined from 35% in 2002 to 27.2% in 2010 
due to more diversity in job titles.  This observation is closely related to their educational 
training, mainly in the engineering discipline.  
With respect to career pathways, the single-group track has constantly been the 
mainstream path. More than 50% of the CEOs came to power through climbing the corporate 
ladder.  The stable majority of the single-group track CEOs suggests that firm-specific 
knowledge is valued in China’s SOE management and insider connections are helpful to secure 
CEO positions. The second most common career pathway is the multi-group track, making up 
for more than 20%. The single-group and the multi-group tracks combined account for more than 
75% of the sample observations. In other words, most of the CEOs developed their careers 
completely within the SOE system rather than moving around in different government spheres. It 
suggests that the party-state maintains a certain degree of separation in human resources training 
between the political and business spheres within the state system.   
The supervisory-bureau track is the next most popular pathway, followed by the multi-
sphere track and the unrelated-government-units track. Note that there is only a marginal and 
declining percentage of CEOs coming to power through the unrelated-government-units track. It 
suggests the party-state does not favor executive candidates who are unfamiliar with the business 
matters of the SOE, which is consistent with its professionalization reform rules.  
None of the CEOs in 2002 and 2005 followed the system-outsider track. A sign of change 
emerged in 2010, however, when one CEO came to power through the system-outsider track: Mr. 
Dazong Wang, the CEO of Beijing Automotive Industry Corporation, a SOE under Beijing 
SASAC’s supervision.  After completing his PhD at Cornell University, Mr. Wang joined 
General Motors (GM) and swiftly worked his way up to the top-level position (Senior Staff) of 
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engineering design in GM. After working at GM for 21 years, Mr. Wang became vice president 
of SAIC Motor Corp., a publicly traded subsidiary of Shanghai Automotive Industry Group, a 
SOE owned by the Shanghai SASAC. In 2008, after less than two years in office at SAIC Motor 
Corp, Mr. Wang parachuted into the CEO position of Beijing Automotive Industry Corporation. 
This case has several noteworthy implications. First, this case happened in the automobile 
industry, an industry not monopolized by the state but relatively open to the private sector and 
foreign companies. Consistent with the expectation in Section IV, competition pressure in the 
non-monopoly industry can drive SOEs to recruit system-outsiders to improve innovation 
capacity. Second, it is a local rather than central SOE that took the initiative to embrace a 
system-outsider. A partial explanation is that the central SOEs are usually of national security 
importance and thus less open to system-outsiders. It also reflects a typical institutional reform 
pattern in China – experiments starting from the local.57 Third, the details of this case provide 
insights into what incentivizes a system-outsider to join SOEs and by which mechanism a 
system-outsider can break into the state system. As Mr. Wang explained, personal sentiment, 
family education and patriotism play a significant role in his decision to join the SOE system.
58
 
His internal aspirations were realized with the help of external opportunities. As GM sought 
rapid expansion in China, Mr. Wang seized the opportunity of transferring to a GM joint venture 
in China and worked there for 3 years until 1997. During his work in China, he became 
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 See ANN M. FLORINI ET AL., CHINA EXPERIMENTS: FROM LOCAL INNOVATION TO NATIONAL REFORM (2012).  
58
 A detailed interview reported in Qicheren (Autobots, a magazine of China’s automobile industry), Nov. 2008 
(reporting Mr. Wang’s explanation : “A man should not forget his own roots. A man who does not know his own 
roots is a pathetic one. …I am a traditional Chinese. … From a personal perspective, I am really grateful to my 
father. My life philosophies are all inherited from my father. I seldom see any person who is as patriotic as my 
father. I always remember my father said repetitively at his death bed that we should learn in the United State and 
apply in China. … My father studied in Japan. Upon returning to China he established the first ceramics high school 
and the first ceramics factory for home appliances in China, becoming the founder of China’s contemporary 
ceramics industry. The old intellectual’s scientific patriotism is deeply passed down to his next generation. What 
leads me is such philosophy. Like my father said, I can contribute by applying in China and simultaneously broaden 
my career horizon.”)  
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acquainted with the then vice president (Mr. Maoyuan Hu) of Shanghai Automotive Industry 
Group and thereafter kept contacts with Mr. Hu. This social connection paved his way into the 
Chinese SOE system.
59
 Mr. Wang’s experience indicates system-insiders’ endorsement is very 
helpful to system-outsiders’ entry into the state system, which supports the common finding that 
personal connections (guanxi) play an important role in the Chinese government system.
60
 
The average tenure is about 8 years. Since the CEOs on average came to power around 
46 years old, they would be only in their mid-50s at the end of the CEO tenure, an age still 
capable of active work. Thus, it raises a question about where they would go after the CEO 
tenure.  [Table 1] shows that about a quarter of the CEOs in 2002 and 2005 followed the so-
called “apprentice model” in which the CEOs were promoted to the chairman, director or other 
executive positions of the same business group. The apprentice model allows the CEOs to 
continue contributing their firm-specific knowledge and to guide their successors before 
transitioning to retirement. 
A featured post-CEO status is transfers to other government units, usually as ministers, 
governors, or government committee members. But this post-CEO career status seems to be on 
the decline, down from 9.2% in 2002 to 4.7% in 2005. Close to 6% of the CEOs took up senior 
manager positions in other business groups, which suggests the government’s personnel rotation 
practice is at work in post-CEO careers. 
As SASAC’s executive recruitment reform rules repetitively emphasize executives’ 
moral integrity, the post-CEO status shows how many CEOs ended up in jail on charges related 
to their executive positions and duties.  The data show that 4% of the CEOs in 2002 and 2.6% in 
2005 were faced with criminal liabilities in relation to their executive duties. The typical criminal 
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charges were corruption and embezzlement. The decline in criminal convictions seem to suggest 
some improvement in moral integrity, albeit inconclusively because many factors such as politics 
could affect the prosecution probabilities in China.  
 While there were a number of CEOs held liable for corruption or embezzlement under the 
Chinese criminal law, none of the CEOs in the dataset ever became defendants in litigations 
involving the breach of fiduciary duties under the Chinese corporate law. The Chinese 
government as the controlling shareholder seems to govern the top managers in a way similar to 
government bureaucrats, who are subject to liabilities under public law such as criminal law.  
As of the end of data tracking, 15.8% of the CEOs in 2002 and 39.1% in 2005 were still 
in office. Finally, this Article identifies at least 13.6% in 2002 and 6.2% in 2005 were inactive 
retirees or decedents while 23.9% in 2002 and 17.2% in 2005 were with unknown post-CEO 
status. The unknown status is due to the fact that biographical information tends to become 
obscure when the CEOs left office, especially for those not moving to prominent positions.  
In summary, the executive educational quality shows some improvement but the political 
and career attributes generally remain stable under the professionalism and marketization 
reforms. While the marketization reform in particular relaxes political affiliation and welcomes 
career diversity, the empirical evidence suggests that executive labor market openness is more of 
the laws on the books than the law in action. The executive labor market remains a game for 
system insiders who have the right political and social connections. 
B. Executive Attributes in Comparative Perspective 
Scholars of comparative corporate governance have well recognized that corporate 
governance regimes may differ in not only their legal arrangements but also elite composition.
61
  
                                                          
61
 See MAIRI MACLEAN, CHARLES HARVEY & JON PRESS, BUSINESS ELITES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
FRANCE AND THE UK (2006).  
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Different legal rules can produce different corporate elites and different corporate elites can also 
generate different legal rules. It thus raises a question about how the CEOs of the Chinese large 
SOEs are different from corporate executives in other countries. Based on the descriptive 
findings in [Table 1], this Article compares Chinese SOE CEOs with executives of the archetype 
countries in comparative capitalism and comparative corporate governance literatures, including 
France of the state activism camp, Japan and Germany of the coordinated market and 
stakeholder-oriented model, and the UK and US of the liberal market and shareholder-oriented 
model.
 62
  A general summary of the executive attributives in comparative perspective is reported 
in [Table 2].  
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
 [Table 2] shows that CEOs of the state activism and the stakeholder-oriented models are 
commonly trained in engineering while those of the shareholder-oriented model tend to be in 
business-related disciplines. The dominance of engineering-trained CEOs is most salient in 
China and Germany. With respect to the alumni network, China and Germany both are on the 
low end of elite school concentration while France and Japan are on the high end, with US and 
UK in between.  
As to career pathways, the prevailing career route in China, Japan, and Germany is 
climbing the corporate ladder to the top within a single-business group while the popular career 
track in UK and US is to follow an external labor market strategy. In France, a significant 
number of CEOs started their careers in the public sector before transferring to the corporate 
sector, which means government work experience is quite common in France. In Japan, while 
many executives follow the so-called amakudari career pathway, most of them do not assume 
                                                          
62
 See VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall 
& David W. Soskice eds., 2001); Vivien A. Schmidt, French Capitalism Transformed, Yet Still a Third Variety of 
Capitalism, 32 ECON. & SOC’Y 526 (2003).  
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CEO positions. Chinese SOE CEOs seem closest to French CEOs in terms of their career 
connections with the government.    
As to the average age of appointment, Chinese SOE CEOs come to power at a younger 
age (around 46 years old) than CEOs in the other countries, usually in their 50s.  But there is no 
sharp difference in terms of tenure, currently in the range of 6-8 years with a trend of shortening 
in length. Finally, unlike Japan and US where outgoing CEOs are commonly appointed as the 
chairman of the same company, China only moderately uses the apprentice model in training and 
guiding CEOs, more similar to the European counterparts. The moderate use of the apprentice 
model in China may be partially due to the fact that many Chinese SOEs have not yet established 
the board of directors. 
Overall, [Table 2] shows the Chinese SOE CEOs bear a resemblance to executives in 
countries of the stakeholder-oriented model and the state activism camp, though the resemblance 
is probably formed by different underlying historical or political forces.  The comparison shows 
Chinese CEOs share many similar attributes particularly with German CEOs while having the 
least in common with UK and US counterparts. This comparison clearly places China far outside 
the category of the liberal market economy or the shareholder-oriented model.   
While the Chinese SOE executives present many characteristics dissimilar to Western 
executives, a more fine-grained data analysis suggests some convergence in terms of the nature 
of career pathways. Scholars find that in Europe and in the United States, CEOs with in-house 
careers (i.e. staying in the same company) spent significantly less time climbing to the top 
compared to those adopting external labor market strategies (i.e. moving across multiple 
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employers).  With ordinary least squared regressions, [Table 3] finds that the nature of Chinese 
executive career pathways shows signs of converging toward the Western findings.
63
  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
[Table 3] shows the nature of the career pathways has changed in terms of age when 
reaching the CEO position. In 2002, the CEOs coming to power via the supervisory-bureau 
pathway were significantly older at the time of appointment than the CEOs through the single-
group pathway,
64
 and the CEOs via the multi-group, unrelated-government-units and multi-
sphere pathways were older as well, albeit not statistically significant.
65
  In 2005, the single-
group career CEOs reached the executive position at a younger age compared to the CEOs of all 
other types of career pathways, but the results for the multi-group and unrelated-government-
units pathways are insignificant.
66
 The trend became clearer in 2010.  The CEOs coming to 
power through the single-group pathway were significantly younger than the CEOs of all other 
types of career pathways.
67
  Among all the types, the system-outsiders were the oldest when 
ascending to power.
68
  The results lend support to the hypothesis that system-outsiders need to 
have established external reputations and high professional status, usually already senior in age, 
to overcome their liability of foreignness when entering into the state system.  Finally, note that 
the CEOs of the supervisory-bureau track were constantly older as they landed in the executive 
position, which can be explained by the retirement strategy as discussed in Section IV.
69
  In short, 
                                                          
63
 See infra app. II.  
64
 See Table 3, the supervisory-bureau track coefficient is 3.903 (p< .01) in Model 1, and 3.549 (p<.01) in Model 2. 
65
 See Table 3, in Model 2, the multi-group track coefficient is .950, the unrelated-government unit track coefficient 
is 1.630 and the multi-sphere track coefficient is 1.462. 
66
 See Table 3, In Model 3, the supervisory-bureau track coefficient is 3.766 (p< .05) and the multi-sphere track 
coefficient is 2.264 (p<.05). In Model 4, the supervisory-bureau track coefficient is 3.029 (p<.05) and the multi-
sphere track coefficient is 2.109 (p< .10, marginally significant).   
67
 See Table 3 All the career pathway coefficients in Models 5 and 6 are positive and statistically significant.   
68
 See Table 3 (using a system-outsider track coefficient of 11.105 (p<.001) in Model 5 and a system-outsider track 
coefficient of 11.465 (p<.001) in Model 6).  
69
 See Table 3  (using both positive and statistically significant supervisory-bureau track coefficients in Models 1–6). 
Draft: Forthcoming in Columbia Business Law Review  
33 
 
the career pathway results suggest that firm-specific knowledge and firm-specific social 
networks have become helpful assets to secure executive positions, similar to the findings about 
Western executives.  
Besides career attributes, [Table 3] shows that elite school attendance was not a 
significant factor in accelerating to the CEO position.
70
  Neither was an engineering degree a 
significant factor when controlling for organizational factors.
71
  The 2002 data suggest having a 
graduate degree was helpful to reaching the CEO positions at a younger age, but the 2005 and 
2010 data indicate a weakening of that advantage.
72
  It could be because the value of graduate 
degrees has diminished as more and more executive candidates have such degrees.  It could also 
be because pursuing a graduate degree postponed the entry into the workforce or distracted 
energy from work and thus delayed promotions.
73
  For organizational variables, while both 
recruiting younger executives and establishing the board of directors are important SOE reform 
measures, [Table 3] shows no significant association between the appointment of younger CEOs 
and the existence of the board directors.74 Moreover, [Table 3] indicates that executives of the 
SOEs owned by the central government tend to reach the CEO position at an older age compared 
to those of the SOEs owned by the local governments, though the result is significant only for 
2001.75 An institutional explanation for this finding is the executive positions of the central SOEs 
have a higher status in the administrative system and thus it takes longer to reach the higher 
positions.  
                                                          
70
 See Table 3 (using all statistically insignificant C9 League coefficients in Models 1–6).  
71
 See Table 3.(using insignificant engineering coefficients in Models 2, 4, and 6). 
72
 See Table 3 (using negative and statistically significant graduate coefficients in Models 1–2, insignificant graduate 
coefficients in Models 3-6).  
73
 Note that rather than completing all education credentials before entering the workforce, many of the CEOs 
pursued their graduate degrees while they were at work.  
74
 See Table 3 (using insignificant board of directors coefficients in Models 2, 4, and 6).  
75
 See Table 3 (using an ownership coefficient of 2.973 (p<.05) in Model 2, 1.495 in Model 4, and 1.049 in Model 
6).  
Draft: Forthcoming in Columbia Business Law Review  
34 
 
[Table 3] also shows that CEOs of the SOEs with a larger number of employees tend to 
be older at the time of appointment, which may be because of more competition in the internal 
labor market.76 Other organizational variables including revenues and return on assets do not 
present statistically significant effects on the executive appointment age. 
C. Post-CEO Status and Governance 
Using logistic regression models, [Table 4] shows results regarding the post-CEO 
development discussed in Section IV.B.77    
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The career pathway variable shows that there is no clear path dependent effect in the 
post-CEO career development. The CEOs of the single-group track are not significantly more 
likely to stay in the same group.78  Meanwhile, the data show that the CEOs of the multi-group 
group are not more likely to transfer to other groups.79  Similarly, the CEOs who had work 
experience in other government units are not significantly more likely to return to government 
bureaus.80  The lack of clear path dependent effects suggests the complexity and unpredictability 
in the SOE elite training system.    
 An interesting finding about the association between the incoming career pathway and 
the outgoing career status is that the CEOs of the unrelated-government-units track are least 
likely to be subject to criminal charges at the end of the CEO position compared to CEOs 
pursuing other career paths, though the results are not statistically significantly.81  This finding 
might be interpreted in two ways.  On the one hand, it might relieve a common concern that 
                                                          
76
 See Table 3(using a (log) number of employees coefficient of 1.201 (p<.001) in Model 2, .892 (p<.05) in Model 4, 
and .607 in Model 6).  
77
 See 52 app. III (explaning the models in more detail). 
78
 See Table 4 (using statistically insignificant career pathway coefficients in Models 1-2). 
79
 See Table 4 (using all the career pathway coefficients in Models 3-4).  
80
 See Table 4 (showing all the career pathway coefficients are statistically insignificant in Models 5 and 6). 
81
 See Table 4 (using the unrelated-government units track coefficient -14.721 in Model 7 and -17.021 in Model 8). 
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CEOs of the unrelated-government-units track may be more likely to mismanage corporate 
governance and incur criminal liability for corruption because they have more politically-tainted 
backgrounds and little business experience.  On the other hand, this finding could suggest that 
such type of  CEOs may be simply more politically savvy in managing their careers in the state 
system and have more political resources to escape legal liabilities, which is not a good sign for 
corporate governance.   
 [Table 4] also shows that the CEOs who graduated from the elite schools are more likely 
to stay in the same group82 and less likely to end up in prison.83  Engineering-trained CEOs are 
also less likely to be criminally convicted after the CEO position.84 The CEOs with a graduate 
degree are also less likely to be imprisoned after the CEO tenure, though the result is 
insignificant.85  Foreign-educated CEOs are more likely to transfer to positions in other business 
groups86 and less likely to be held for criminal liabilities.87  In general, [Table 4] shows that 
better education is negatively associated with criminal liability at the end of the CEO tenure.  
Thus, improvement in executive educational credentials may be a good sign for the quality of 
corporate leadership. 
An important question in corporate governance is whether the board of directors plays a 
role in executive career development and behavior. [Table 4] shows that CEOs of the SOEs 
which have set up the board of directors are more likely to assume the chairman, director, or 
other executive positions in the same business group.88  The result is unsurprising given that the 
transition to the chairman or director position is only possible when a board exists within the 
                                                          
82
 See Table 4 (the C9 League coefficient is 1.095 (p<.05) in Model 1 and 1.201 (p<.05) in Model 2). 
83
 See Table 4 (the C9 League coefficient is -16.387 in Model 8). 
84
 See Table 4 (the engineering coefficient is -2.170 (p<.01) in Model 8).  
85
 See Table 4 (the graduate degree coefficient is -.995 in Model 7 and -1.419 in Model 8).  
86
 See Table 4 (the foreign study coefficient is 3.088 (p<.001) in Model 3 and 2.659 (p<.01) in Model 4).  
87
 See Table 4 (the foreign study coefficient is -13.847 (p<.001) in Model 7and -14.717 in Model 8). 
88
 See Table 4 (in Model 2, the board of directors coefficient is 1.234 (p<.01)).  
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group.   Moreover, the presence of a board of directors reduces the likelihood of a CEO 
becoming a senior official in government bureaus, which suggests the board might play a role in 
cutting political connections.89  However, there is no evidence that the board of directors plays  
any effective role in reducing the likelihood of (outrageous) executive criminal behavior.90  This 
finding suggests the monitoring function of the board of directors may not be properly at work.  
Finally, [Table 4] shows that CEOs of the central SOEs are less likely to transfer to government 
bureaus after tenure, compared to CEOs of the local ones.
91
 The post-CEO personnel integration 
between the SOEs and other government units seems higher at the local than the central level.      
D. Implications, Challenges and Future Research 
This Article analyzes the executive composition and recruitment evolvement of China’s 
large non-financial SOEs.  It shifts away from the typical focus on how the things operate to who 
the people in charge are, which is an important approach to understanding corporate governance 
and economic development in countries with weak legal institutions. This Article shows some 
improvement in educational credentials and general stability in political affiliation and career 
patterns. The executive recruitment reform of China’s large SOEs is oriented toward politically-
bounded and firm-specific knowledge professionalism, as well as potential bottom-up and 
competition-driven marketization. It also shows similarities and dissimilarities between the 
Chinese SOE executives and their foreign counterparts. Moreover, this Article shows the 
complexity of the Chinese elite training system, where there is no clear path-dependent effect on 
the post-CEO status and there is no conclusively bad association between political career 
experience and executive criminal liabilities. Finally, this Article finds little evidence that the 
board of directors of China’s SOEs plays any significant role in affecting executive career 
                                                          
89
 See Table 4 (in Model 6, the board of directors coefficient is -1.032 (p<.05)).  
90
 See Table 4 (in Model 8, the board of directors coefficient is .739) [BB Rule 3.5 + 4.1].  
91
 See Table 4 (in Model 6, the central ownership coefficient is -1.398 (p<.05)).  
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development or avoiding serious executive criminal behavior.  Based on these findings, this 
Article discusses the adequacy of existing international legal rules and enforcement concerning 
SOE governance, the challenges posed to China’s SOE governance improvement, and some 
directions for future research.  
1. Implications for International Legal Systems 
Chinese SOEs are not only important actors in China’s domestic economy but also active 
players in the global investment market.  Their active global expansion raises immediate 
questions to international regulators about the adequacy and capacity of existing legal rules and 
enforcement to cope with such unconventional corporate entities.  This section demonstrates why 
an investigation into Chinese SOE executive backgrounds is helpful in reexamining existing 
legal regimes governing the SOEs’ international activity. 
One global expansion strategy of Chinese SOEs is to acquire control of foreign 
companies.  Such acquisitions often raise national security concerns and trigger regulatory 
reviews in the host country.  In the United States, for example, parties to a transaction that could 
result in control of a U.S. business by a foreign person may file a notice with the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to determine whether such transaction would 
present any national security risks.
92
  This determination is based on several factors: the extent to 
which the foreign acquirer’s investment decisions are based solely on commercial grounds; 
whether corporate governance structures are in place to ensure management independence from 
the controlling government; and the degree of transparency in the foreign acquirer’s investment 
purposes, institutional arrangements, and financial information.
93
  Understanding executive 
political attributes and career patterns is helpful in evaluating the degree of management 
                                                          
92
 Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,567, 74,572 (regarding 31 C.F.R. pt. 800) (Dec. 8, 2008).  
93
 Id. at 74,571.  
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independence and the way of government involvement in corporate investment decisions.  As 
this Article shows, although having a board of directors in place makes the SOE governance 
structure appear closer to international standards, there is little evidence showing better quality in 
corporate leadership.  This Article also shows that there is great complexity in the executive 
personnel system—having a CEO without prior career experience in government bureaus (e.g. a 
single-group or a multi-group track CEO) does not indicate more managerial independence from 
the government because a political career connection can emerge in post-CEO career 
development.  Moreover, although the Chinese government has reduced its ownership stake in 
many SOEs over the past decade, executive personnel integration with some important 
government organs has been increasing rather than decreasing at the same time, as revealed in 
this Article.  The size of the ownership stake alone is an insufficient indicator to precisely judge 
the potential degree of state involvement in SOE management; other factors such as executive 
personnel management should be considered as well. 
The executive characteristics of SOEs also have legal implications for securities 
regulations in international capital markets.  Chinese SOEs have been active in listing shares 
overseas.  Do Chinese SOEs’ corporate disclosures to international investors provide an adequate 
and accurate depiction of their actual governance practices?  Chinese SOEs always significantly 
downplay their connections to the Chinese government and its ruling political party in their 
corporate disclosures.  The role of the government is very often condensed in one simple 
sentence: the company is owned by the State; and the role of the Chinese Communist Party is 
virtually never explained.  Their prospectuses and annual reports very often omit the top 
managers’ affiliation with the national representative political bodies and never explain their 
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responsibilities as members of the party committee.
94
  The executive biographies in such 
disclosures are focused on business experiences but void of political backgrounds, intentionally 
making the top executives look similar to their Western counterparts.  Also, these companies 
never disclose the fact that the appointment power is held by the Chinese Communist Party, and 
not the board of directors.  Furthermore, there is no disclosure that the top managers are 
prohibited from freely exercising stock options because of the SOE personnel integration with 
other government units.
95
  In short, a significant amount of material information is omitted or 
misrepresented.  While the lack of adequate disclosure is mainly a result of the secretive culture 
of the Chinese government, it is also partly an outcome of calculated advice by Western 
investment bankers, law firms, and accounting firms to make Chinese SOEs attractive to 
international investors;
96
 and international securities regulators’ generally loose enforcement 
against foreign companies, whether state-owned or not.
97
  As political interference is a major 
concern in SOE governance, existing disclosure practices regarding Chinese SOEs’ political 
connections should be reassessed to ensure all material information is adequately revealed to 
international investors. 
2. Challenges for Chinese SOE Governance Improvement 
China’s Company Law is the central object of study in the literature of Chinese corporate 
governance.  Although the Company Law provides the fundamental legal structure of corporate 
                                                          
94
 For example, Sinopec, PetroChina, China Mobile, China Telecom, ChinaUnicom, and Huaneng Power are leading 
Chinese SOEs with shares listed on the New York, London and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges.  The chairman of 
each of these companies is a member of the Party’s National Congress, China’s Parliament and/or China’s National 
Political Consultative Conference.  However, such political affiliation information is not disclosed in the companies’ 
annual reports. See the English annual reports of these companies.  
95
 See Chen et. al, supra note 6, at 14. 
96
 See RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA’S COMMUNIST RULERS 48 (2010). See also 
CARL E. WALTER & FRASER J.T. HOWIE, RED CAPITALISM (2011); CARL E. WALTER & FRASER J.T. HOWIE, 
PRIVATIZING CHINA (2006).  
97
 See Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively By Renting U.S. Securities Laws?, 75 J. FIN. 
ECON. 319, 321 (2004) (finding that U.S. SEC enforcement actions against Mexican firms are practically 
nonexistent and suggesting that this trend extends to all foreign firms).  
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entities, including state-owned companies, the SOE governance regime, to a great extent, is built 
on a set of special laws such as the State-Owned Enterprise Assets Law (2008) and a large body 
of administrative rules and guidelines in the shadows.  The statutory language of the Company 
Law shows objectivity with no trace of political proclivity toward the Chinese Communist Party. 
However, the large body of shadow administrative rules and guidelines governing the SOE 
management unashamedly reveal strong political preferences serving the Party’s interests.  The 
executive recruitment guidelines examined in this Article are a great example.  The state-owner’s 
dual role as a shareholder and a regulator can easily construct a legal system in favor of its 
interests.
98
  This is particularly true for the Chinese state-owner as the single-ruling party. 
Compared to high-profile legislation, such as the Company Law where there is more or less 
public oversight, the administrative rules and guidelines that specify the detailed implementation 
of the state-owner’s rights and responsibilities have very low transparency and face paltry 
scrutiny.  The low-profile administrative rules can be handy instruments for the state-owner to 
undercut the corporate governance reform goals stated in the high-profile laws.   
Besides the problem of shadow rules, the substantive management of Chinese SOEs may 
have the problem of excessive closure.  The empirical evidence in this Article shows that the 
business elite of the Chinese large SOEs are a very cohesive group in terms of their educational 
training, political affiliations, and career experiences.  The current executive labor market 
remains a system-insider’s game.  The elite cohesion presents some advantages but also 
challenges to China’s corporate governance and national economy.  According to sociologist 
Ronald Burt’s analysis of “brokerage and closure” in social structure, while high cohesion can 
help consensus formation and policy implementation, it runs the risks of closure, groupthink, and 
                                                          
98
 See Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2917, 2944-2955 
(2012) (finding in practice that Chinese corporate law serves to protect the government’s interest as a controlling 
shareholder while denying significant legal rights to minority shareholders).  
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a lack of creativity.
99
   Building brokerage ties reaching outside the closed system can import 
new ideas and stimulate innovation.  As competition in the global economy has become more 
dependent on innovation capacity, Chinese SOEs need inputs of new talent and new management 
skills in order to gain a competition edge.  The Chinese government seems aware of the potential 
closure problem and has adopted some administrative measures to open the SOE executive labor 
market.  
In the eyes of the Party, neither complete closure nor complete openness is desirable 
because complete closure lacks competitiveness and complete openness runs the risk of losing 
control.  It will take time for the Chinese government to learn how to strike a balance between 
closure and openness.  The openness of the executive labor market probably will start from 
lower-level managers to high level-managers, from the business groups owned by the local 
governments to those controlled by the central government, from companies faced with fierce 
competition pressure to companies in monopolized sectors.  But the evidence in this Article 
suggests that the whole process will develop slowly because personnel management remains a 
highly sensitive area and the Chinese government still takes it as the most important way to 
continue to control large enterprises as the government reduces its ownership stake.  
Moreover, while China’s SOEs have a demand for professionals who are trained outside 
the state system, the executive reform process can be conditioned by the supply side of talent—
whether system-outsiders are interested in joining the SOEs.  For example, in several instances, 
SASAC officials have extended offers to system-outsiders, only to have the candidates decline 
the offers because the pay was below prevailing market standards.
100
  To handle this problem, 
                                                          
99
 See Burt, supra note 11.  
100
 For example, Mr. Jigang Jiang, the Director of central SASAC’s Second Executive Administration Bureau, 
explained, “In 2005, there was a candidate who studied aboard and worked in a foreign multinational company and 
then transferred to the CEO position of the multinational’s branch in China.  The candidate applied for a vice CEO 
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the Chinese government is experimenting with a dual system in executive compensation.  Under 
the dual system the compensation of system-insiders, as is tradition, is unilaterally set by the 
evaluation of the SASAC, while system-outsiders are paid based on market prices through 
contract negotiation.  The latter compensation is usually much higher than the former.  It is 
unclear whether such dualism will work well because anecdotal evidence shows that it can brew 
resentment among system insiders.
101
  In addition, the SOE management culture typically tainted 
with political complexities may make system-outsiders shy away from joining the SOE system.  
As a result, the executive labor market probably will continue to be dominated by system-
insiders for a long time, which increases the risks of perpetuating old practices that deviate from 
international standards.  The lack of substantive openness in the composition of the SOE 
corporate leadership can be a fundamental cause for the common dysfunction of many corporate 
governance institutions such as the board of directors and independent directors.   
3. Directions for Future Research 
To date, scholars of comparative corporate law have paid scant attention to comparative 
state-owned enterprises.
102
  This research lacuna needs to be filled as SOEs continue to play a 
significant role in many economies.  The Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) has recognized the importance of this topic and initiated surveys on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
position of a central SOE.  He passed the written exam and interviews with the highest scores.  We really wanted to 
hire him, but this hiring was unsuccessful due to compensation gaps.  The candidate asked for a pay at least on par 
with his current pay ($200,000 USD).  The candidate was very sincere and said he was motivated by patriotism and 
the passion to contribute to the development of the central SOEs, so he did not ask for any pay raise but hoped to 
stay on his current level.  The deal was eventually killed because the asking pay in fact was equal to the total 
compensation of the other seven top managers of the hiring SOE.” See Beijing News, Forty Percent of the Central 
SOE Executives Recruited Worldwide are from Inside the System, May 2011.  
101
 See id.  
102
 Very recently, a small number of corporate governance scholars have begun to approach this topic. See Aldo  
Musacchio & Sérgio G. Lazzarini, Leviathan in Business: Varieties of State Capitalism and Their Implications for 
Economic Performance (Working Paper 12-108 June 4, 2012) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2070942.  
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legal frameworks and governance mechanisms of SOEs in the OECD member countries.
 103
  It 
also has adopted the first international standards for SOE governance.
104
  The OECD surveys 
show various cross-country variations and similarities in the SOE governance rules including the 
executive appointment process.
105
  The findings in the OECD reports and in this Article both 
indicate further investigation of the underlying causes of the SOE governance similarities and 
differences.  For instance, this Article shows that the Chinese SOE executives bear many 
similarities with executives in countries of the state activism camp and the stakeholder-oriented 
model, especially German executives.  How do we explain the apparent similarities?  Are the 
underlying causes for the prevalence of engineering-trained CEOs in China similar to those in 
Germany?  Also, are the underlying causes for the single-group track as the prevailing career 
pathway in China similar to those in Germany and Japan?  To answer these questions, a context-
rich comparison of the legal system, political institution, industrial structure, occupation training 
system, social organization, and cultural values is required.  The investigation into the underlying 
causes would also help to evaluate the usefulness and appropriateness of the international SOE 
governance standards proposed by the OECD as the legal transplant literature has warned against 
adopting internationally standardized corporate governance rules without a context-rich 
analysis.
106
 
In addition to comparative study across countries, future research may compare locally 
the corporate leaders in the state-owned sector with those in the private sector in China.  Are they 
are a cohesive group?  If not, by what specific attributes are they different?  Moreover, as this 
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 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: A 
SURVEY OF OECD COUNTRIES (2005); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.,  State-Owned Enterprise 
(updating the 2005 survey).  
104 
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-
OWNED ENTERPRISES (2005).  
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 See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., supra note 103.  
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See Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 
97, 98 (2002) (finding that the law must be understood and embraced by law enforcers and legal customers).  
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Article shows SASAC and the Party’s Organization Department have formulated standards on 
executive qualifications, what sources do they consult to derive such standards?  Do they consult 
the experience in the Chinese private sector or hold any country as the model to emulate?  It can 
be useful to explain the apparent similarities in executive attributes with other countries and find 
out if there is any diffusion of a specific executive model.  Qualitative research methods such as 
interviews with Chinese government officials and top managers are helpful to gain insights into 
this inquiry. 
Besides comparative study, this Article raises questions for further empirical 
investigation.  Future research may track more data years further back into the past and extended 
into the future to reveal a bigger picture of the evolution in the elite composition and its impact 
on micro-corporate behavior as well as macro-institutional changes.  For example, a preliminary 
test by this author (unreported in this Article) on the relationship between types of career 
pathways and profitability suggests SOEs with CEOs coming to power through the unrelated 
government units track seem to have the worst performance in return on assets.  It needs future 
research to scrutinize the relationship between executive career attributes and different 
dimensions of corporate performance.  Similarly, if in the future more system-outsiders join the 
SOE system, there will be a large enough pool of observations (currently, there is only one 
observation in the sample) to statistically examine what kinds of SOEs are likely to hire system-
outsiders and whether such system-outsiders contribute to any corporate behavior such as 
profitability or organizational culture change. 
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[Table 1] CEO Attributes of Large State-Owned Non-Financial Enterprises in China, 2002-2010  
 2002 2005 2010 
General Attributes    
               Male 96.7% 96.4% 97.4% 
               Main Birth Place (i.e. Shandong Province) 13% (N=185) 14.1% (N=206) 11.5% (N=182) 
Educational Attributes    
               Graduate Degree 37.5% 49.3% 57.1% 
               Foreign Degree 2.9% 3.3% 4.4% 
               Tsinghua University 2.9% 2.9% 5.5% 
               C9 League 15.8% 12.8% 11.4% 
               Engineering 61.8% 62.8% 66.3% 
Political Attributes    
               Party Membership  
1. Communist 
2. Other 
3. Unknown 
 
83.5% 
.4% 
16.1% 
 
85.4% 
.4% 
14.2% 
 
80.6% 
.7% 
18.7% 
               Average Age When Joining the Communist Party (CPC) 26.4 (N=51) 25.7 (N=66) 25.3 (N=77) 
               Member of National Congress, National Consultative Assembly, 
or CPC National Congress
a 
8.1% 11.7% 19.4% 
Career Attributes     
               Average Age When Becoming CEO 46.4 46.3 46.8 
               Main Starting Position Title (“Technician”) 36.1% (N=158) 33.5% (N=170) 27.8% (N=169) 
               Career Pathways    
                         1. Single-Group Track 52.9% 56.2% 52% 
                         2. Multi-Group Track 23.5% 22.6% 24.2% 
                         3. Supervisory-Bureau Track 15.8% 9.1% 12.1% 
                         4. Unrelated-Government Unit Track 3.7% 2.9% 2.2% 
                         5. Multi-Sphere Track 4% 9.1% 9.2% 
                         6. System-Outsider Track   0% 0% .4% 
               Tenure 8.8 8.1 NA
c
 
               Status After CEO Position
b 
  NA
c 
1. Chairman/Director/Executive of the Group 27.8% 23.4%  
2. Senior Government Official (e.g., Minister, Governor, 
Committee Member) 
9.2% 4.7% 
 
3. Director/CEO/Senior Manager of other Groups 5.9% 6.6%   
4. Convicted Prisoner 4% 2.6%  
5. Still CEO of the Group 15.8% 39.1%  
6. Inactive Retiree/Decedent 13.6% 6.6%  
7. Unknown 23.9% 17.2%  
N (Default, if not specified otherwise) 272 274 273 
a    
The membership is counted as whether the CEO was a member of the political bodies of that year. 
b 
  The post-CEO statuses were tracked till October 2011. 
c    
Because many of the CEOs just took office and 88.6% of the 2010 CEOs are still in power, this measure is not properly 
applicable. 
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[Table 2] Executive Attributes in Comparative Perspective 
 State Activism Coordinated Market /  
Stakeholder Oriented 
Liberal Market /  
Shareholder-Oriented 
China (SOEs only) France Japan Germany UK USA 
Educational 
Attributes 
      
Dominant 
Educational 
Discipline 
 
Engineering or 
natural science 
(more than 60% 
with an increasing 
trend) 
 
Engineering or 
natural science 
(more than 30% as 
of 2005), followed 
by business, 
economics or 
administration 
Engineering or 
natural science 
(more than 30% 
as of 2011); law, 
economics 
Engineering or 
natural science 
(more than 50% as 
of 2005) 
Business-Related Business-Related 
Elite School 
Concentration 
 
C9 League, 
particularly 
Tsinghua 
University 
 
 
Grandes École, 
particularly 
Polytechnique and 
École Nationale 
d'Administration 
 
Tokyo, Kyoto, 
Waseda and Keio  
No specific 
concentration 
Cambridge and 
Oxford 
Ivy League and a 
number of elite 
schools (about 13 
in total), with 
Harvard 
University as the 
lead  
Degree of Elite 
School 
Concentration 
 
Low 
(about 11% as of 
2010) 
High 
(about 75% as of 
2005) 
High 
(about 60% as of 
2009) 
Low Moderate-High 
(about 40% as of 
2007) 
Moderate 
(more than 20% 
as of 2011) 
Career Attributes       
Prevailing Career 
Pathway 
 
Singe-group 
pathway within 
the state system 
(more than 50%) 
Lengthy careers in 
state service before 
transfer to business  
Singe-group 
pathway 
 
Singe-group 
pathway 
(more than 55% as 
of 2005) 
Multi-employer 
pathway 
Multi-employer 
pathway 
(less than a third 
as lifetime 
employees)  
Work Experience 
in Government 
 
When broadly 
defined (SOEs as 
part of 
government): 
Very High (more 
than 99%)  
                                             
When narrowly 
defined (only 
government units 
other than SOEs): 
Moderate (about 
20%) 
Moderate-High 
(more than 50% in 
1998 down to 38% 
in 2005) 
Low-Moderate Low Low Low 
Approximate Age 
of Appointment  
Mid-Late 40s Early 50s Mid-Late 50s Early 50s Early 50s Early 50s 
Average Tenure 
 
About 8 years, 
with a declining 
trend 
 
About 8 years (as of 
2011) 
About 6 years in 
2007, down from 
8 years in 1995 
About 8 years, with 
a declining trend 
down from 12 
years in 1980  
About 6-7 years 
(as of 2011) 
down from 9.6 in 
1995 
 About 8 years 
down from 10 
years from 2010 
Apprenticeship  
Model in Training 
CEOs  
Low-Moderate 
(About 25%) 
Low† High Low† Low† Moderate-High 
(43% as of 2011) 
Sources:  
Data on France from Vivien A. Schmidt, Vivien A, A Profile of the French CEO, 35 INT’L EXECUTIVE 413 (1993); Taeyoung Yoo and Soo Hee Lee, In Search 
of Social Capital in State-Activist Capitalism: Elite Networks in France and Korea, 30 ORG. STUD. 529 (2009); Mairi Maclean, Charles Harvey, and Jon 
Press, BUSINESS ELITE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FRANCE AND THE UK (2006); Booz & Company, CEO SUCCESSION REPORT: 12TH ANNUAL 
GLOBAL CEO SUCCESSION STUDY  (2012). 
Data on Japan from Booz & Company, CEO SUCCESSION 2000-2009: A DECADE OF CONVERGENCE AND COMPRESSION (2010); Booz & Company, CEP 
SUCCESSION 2008: STABILITY IN THE STORM (2009); Booz & Company, CEO SUCCESSION REPORT 2003: THE PERILS OF “GOOD” GOVERNANCE (2004); 
Booz & Company, CEO SUCCESSION REPORT: 12TH ANNUAL GLOBAL CEO SUCCESSION STUDY (2012). 
Data on Germany from Saskia Freye, Germany’s New Top Managers? The Corporate Elite in Flux, 1960–2005,  MPIfG Discussion Paper 10/10, 2010;  Booz 
& Company, CEO SUCCESSION REPORT: 12TH ANNUAL GLOBAL CEO SUCCESSION STUDY (2012); Paul Windolf, CORPORATE NETWORKS IN EUROPE AND 
THE UNITED STATES (2002). 
Data on United States from Peter Cappelli and Monica Hamori, The New Path to the Top, 83 HARV. BUS. REV.  (2005); Richard S Tedlow, Purrington, 
Courtney and Bettcher, Kim Eric, The American CEO in the Twentieth Century: Demography and Career Path, Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 
03-097, 2003; Jeffrey S. Sanders, The Path To Becoming A Fortune 500 CEO, FORBES, December 2011; Booz & Company, CEO SUCCESSION REPORT: 12TH 
ANNUAL GLOBAL CEO SUCCESSION STUDY (2012); Jason D. Schloetzer & Matteo Tonello, The 2011 CEO SUCCESSION REPORT (2011) 
† Booz&Co (2012) reports at the overall European level, rather than on specific countries.
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[Table 3] OLS Regression Analysis of Executive Career Pathways and Age of Attainment, 2002-2010 
 Dependent Variable: Age When Becoming the CEO 
 2002 2005 2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Career Pathways       
1. Single-Group Track 
 
-----------------------------------------------------Omitted as Reference Category----------------------------------------------------- 
2. Multi-Group Track 
 
1.316 
(.999) 
.950 
(.944) 
1.406 
(.932) 
1.425 
(.925) 
4.143*** 
(.776) 
3.679*** 
(.774) 
3. Supervisory-Bureau Track 
 
3.903** 
(1.123) 
3.549** 
(1.046) 
3.766* 
(1.443) 
3.029* 
(1.209) 
4.480*** 
(1.127) 
4.443*** 
(1.070) 
4. Unrelated-Government-Units Track 
 
2.487 
(1.571) 
1.630 
(1.465) 
1.999 
(2.149) 
1.854 
(1.571) 
5.191** 
(1.804) 
4.620** 
(1.635) 
5. Multi-Sphere Track 
 
2.742 
(1.508) 
1.462 
(1.759) 
2.264* 
(1.104) 
2.109† 
(1.103) 
3.313* 
(1.406) 
2.691* 
(1.177) 
6. System-Outsider Track a 
 
    11.105*** 
(1.314) 
11.465*** 
(1.374) 
Educational Backgrounds       
C9 League 
 
-.567 
(1.020) 
-1.109 
(1.030) 
.439 
(1.017) 
-.185 
(1.127) 
-.532 
(.846) 
-1.363 
(.872) 
Engineering 
 
3.087*** 
(.823) 
1.249 
(.832) 
1.434 
(.829) 
.248 
(.826) 
.564 
(.790) 
-.167 
(.741) 
Graduate Degree 
 
-2.836*** 
(.788) 
-3.300*** 
(.727) 
-.711 
(.749) 
-.634 
(.730) 
-1.024 
(.708) 
-.418 
(.684 
Foreign Study 
 
4.881† 
(2.605) 
3.322 
(2.393) 
.913 
(1.711) 
-.140 
(1.178) 
-1.839 
(1.350) 
-2.364† 
(1.370)  
Organizational Controls       
Board of Directors (Yes=1) 
 
 1.270 
(1.017) 
 -1.264 
(.949) 
 -1.616 
(.375) 
Ownership (Central Gov.=1) 
 
 2.973* 
(1.222) 
 1.495 
(1.097) 
 1.049 
(.964) 
Log Revenues 
 
 .499 
(.443) 
 .292 
(.522) 
 .502 
(.505) 
Log Employees 
 
 1.201*** 
(.328) 
 .892* 
(.399) 
 .607 
(.375) 
Return on Assets 
 
 -.115 
(.117) 
 -.143 
(.103) 
 -.147 
(.124) 
Constant 
 
44.367*** 
(.910) 
26.211*** 
(4.729) 
44.693*** 
(.939) 
33.311*** 
(6.368) 
45.193*** 
(.908) 
33.139*** 
(6.046) 
Observations 272 263 274 272 273 270 
R-squared .122 .284 .049 .157 .145 .250 
The table presents unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance Level: † p<.1  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. The lower the significance level, the stronger the evidence. 
a The system-outsider category is omitted for the years of 2002 and 2005 because there is no observation falling into this category.
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 [Table 4] Logistic Regression Analysis of Post-CEO Status, 2002-2010 
 Post-CEO Career Status 
 Chairman/Director/Execu
tive of the Same Group 
Director/Executive of 
Other Groups 
Senior Government Official Convicted Prisoner 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Career Pathways         
1. Single-Group Track 
 
---------------REF------------- 
-.689 
(.620) 
-.379 
(.663) 
-.575 
(.603) 
-.644 
(.660) 
----------------REF---------------- 
2. Multi-Group Track 
 
-.439 
(.340) 
-.350 
(.364) 
----------------REF---------------- 
-.500 
(.645) 
-.365 
(.690) 
.566 
(.678) 
1.302 
(.778) 
3. Supervisory-Bureau 
Track 
-.808 
(.483) 
-.628 
(.510) 
.762 
(.739) 
.869 
(.768) -------------------REF----------------- 
.104 
(.907) 
.824 
(.982) 
4. Unrelated-Government-
Units Track 
-1.364 
(.754) 
-1.455 
(.799) 
1.919 
(.805) 
2.623** 
(.917) 
.424 
(.870) 
.610 
(1.025) 
-14.721 
(.638) 
-17.021 
(4909.2) 
5. Multi-Sphere Track 
 
-.398 
(.574) 
-.535 
(.621) 
1.250 
(.784) 
1.326 
(.848) 
-.599 
(.936) 
-.872 
(1.047) 
.104 
(.920) 
2.166 
(1.293) 
6. System-Outsider Track a 
 
        
Educational Backgrounds         
C9 League 
 
1.095* 
(.436) 
1.210* 
(.480) 
.173 
(.633) 
.190 
(.654) 
-1.311 
(.769) 
-1.018 
(.808) 
-.827 
(1.260) 
-16.387 
(2647.8) 
Engineering 
 
-.016 
(.314) 
-.167 
(.343) 
.110 
(.517) 
.233 
(.564) 
.665 
(.433) 
.421 
(.480) 
-1.548 
(.574) 
-2.170** 
(.746) 
Graduate Degree 
 
.699* 
(.302) 
.618 
(.313) 
-.180 
(.520) 
-.125 
(.537) 
.071 
(.384) 
.042 
(.408) 
-.995 
(.677) 
-1.419 
(.803) 
Foreign Study 
 
-1.129† 
(.674) 
-.899 
(.752) 
3.088*** 
(.766) 
2.659** 
(.826) 
-.944 
(1.094) 
-.445 
(1.140) 
-13.847*** 
(.729) 
-14.717 
(5246.9) 
Organizational Variables         
Board of Directors (Yes=1) 
 
 1.234** 
(.398) 
 -.796 
(.593) 
 -1.032* 
(.510) 
 .739 
(.880) 
Ownership (Central Gov.=1) 
 
 .580 
(.447) 
 .155 
(.688) 
 -1.398* 
(.652) 
 -.807 
(1.113) 
Log Revenues 
 
 -.011 
(.155) 
 .150 
(.242) 
 .185 
(.214) 
 -.430 
(.361) 
Log Employees 
 
 .166 
(.154) 
 -.183 
(.200) 
 .447* 
(.217) 
 .578 
(.335) 
Return on Assets 
 
 .060 
(.042) 
 -.075 
(.078) 
 -.100 
(.074) 
 .059 
(.069) 
Life course control         
Age at Appointment 
 
-.055* 
(.025) 
-.071* 
(.028) 
-.070 
(.040) 
-.087* 
(.044) 
-.074* 
(.032) 
-.097* 
(.038) 
.046 
(.047) 
.070 
(.060) 
Constant 
 
2.395 
(1.230) 
.468 
(1.995) 
-.028 
(1.558) 
1.196 
(3.142) 
1.304 
(1.467) 
-3.472** 
(2.683) 
-3.912 
(2.182) 
-5.541 
(4.526) 
Observations 232 229 232 229 232 229 232 229 
   (df) 30.22(9) 43.32(14) 31.37(9) 33.56(14) 12.80(9) 27.05(14) 15.12(9) 26.58 (14) 
p-value .000 .000 .000 .002 .186 .019 .088 .022 
The table presents unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance Level: † p<.1  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. The lower the significance level, the stronger the evidence. 
a The system-outsider category is omitted because there is no observation falling into this category. 
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 [Appendix I]  
Institutional Reforms and Data Years 
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[Appendix II] 
Model Explanation for Table 3 
 
The dependent variable in [Table 3] is age when appointed as the CEO. The personal attributes 
include career pathways and educational backgrounds. Career pathways as one of the 
independent variables are measured as dummy variables with the single-group track as the 
reference category.  The statistical interpretation of using the single-group track as the reference 
category is: compared to the CEOs of the single-group track, the CEOs of another track (e.g. the 
multi-group track) tend to reach the executive position at an older/younger age.  
 
Educational credentials are measured as dummy variables, respectively, of whether the executive 
is a graduate of C9 League (yes=1), whether the executive has an engineering degree (yes=1), a 
graduate degree (yes=1), and a foreign degree (yes=1).  
 
In addition to personal factors, different organizational environments may affect career outcomes. 
Some China’s large SOEs recently have started to experiment with launching the board of 
directors as a device to monitor executives. The board of directors is included as a dummy 
variable (yes=1) to test whether SOEs having established the board of directors may be more 
active in reform and thus more likely to have younger CEOs, who tend to be less constrained by 
old traditions.  Moreover, considered that SOEs owned by the central government tend to have 
national importance in the economy and thus have stricter standards in executive quality than 
SOEs owned by local governments, central ownership is included as a dummy variable (yes=1) 
in the models. The firm revenues variable is included to control for firm size; the number of 
employees is to control for the internal labor market size, and return on assets for profitability.  
The variables including revenues and number of employees are log transformed. 
 
The data concerning executive personal attributes (including career and education) are manually 
collected by this author from multiple sources including corporate prospectuses, annual reports, 
corporate websites, government documents and websites, industrial association websites, and 
news reports. The data concerning organizational attributes are purchased from the China 
Enterprise Confederation and China Enterprise Directors Association.   
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 [Appendix III] 
Model Explanation for Table 4 
 
[Table 4] uses binary logistic regression models to examine how personal and organizational 
attributes affect the post-CEO status. Binary logistic regression is a type of regression analysis 
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable: coded 1 (yes=1) or 0 (no=0). 
 
The sample size with missing data excluded is 232 CEOs who left office during the period of 
examination.  The dependent variables are four types of immediate post-CEO statuses and 
constructed as dummy variables (yes=1): (1) the chairman/director/other executive of the same 
business group; (2) a director/executive of other business groups; (3) a senior official in other 
government units; (4) a convicted prisoner.  
 
Types of career pathways as one of the independent variables are measured as dummy variables 
with the single-group track as the reference category in Models 1-2 and 7-8, with the multi-group 
track as the reference category in Models 3-4 and with the supervisory bureau track as the 
reference category in Models 5-6. Other independent and control variables are similar to those 
used in [Table 3]. Models 1,3,5,7 include personal variables only (i.e. career pathway and 
educational variables) while Models 2,4,6,8 are full models including all the independent and 
controlling variables. 
